

Russia's Information Campaign Against Ukraine

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Vilnius, Lithuania

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Presentation outline

- 1. Aim of the analysis
- 2. Context of the Information Campaign
- 3. Execution of the Information Campaign
- 4. Russia's strategic narratives
- 5. Strong and weak points of the Campaign
- 6. Conclusions

EXCELLENC solutions mapping



Aim of the Analysis

- Analyse the Russia's information campaign against Ukraine from the strategic communications perspective - from the EU Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius (NOV 2013) to the annexation of Crimea (MAR 2014)
- Analyse the **methods** used for execution of the campaign, its **strengths and weaknesses**



Context

«The breakup of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century»

(V.Putin)



Context (cont.)

- Russia's information campaign against Ukraine has to be viewed in the context of the developments within Russia during the past 15 years resulting in centralization of power and increased state control over media
- Supportive policy documents: Foreign Policy Review (2007), State Security Strategy (2009)






- Military action starts by groups of troops during peacetime (war is not declared at all).
- Non-contact clashes between highly maneuverable interspecific fighting groups.
- Annihilation of the enemy's military and economic power by short-time precise strikes in strategic military and civilian infrastructure.
- Massive use of high-precision weapons and special operations, robotics, and weapons that use new physical principles (direct-energy weapons lasers, shortwave radiation, etc.)
- Use of armed civilians (4 civilians to 1 military).
- Simultaneous strike on the enemy's units and facilities in all of the territory.
- Simultaneous battle on land, air, sea, and in the informational space.



Information Campaign Execution



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PSYOPS

THIS IS NOT DONBASS, UKRAINE IT'S AN IMAGE FROM A FEATURE FILM PILM JuliaPGoncharova FESTIVAL . Follow #savedonbaspeople #SaveDonbassPeople pic.twitter.com/riximoiLtXX a finity an format a Favores 3 48 PM - 27 May 2014 Fag rade #SaveDonbassPeople 1 2 8 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 stille | presa-reloase **Dala Screenings** The Brest Fortress Breebekaya krepoel Director, Aleisandr Kolt Russia, Republic of Belanux; 2010; 120 min. THIS IS DEMOCRACY, BABY Uppinikov3 Carnera Vladimir Bashta **UKRAINIAN ARMY IS KILLING DONBASS PEOPLE** Production design Aller Matvejchuk Music Yuri Krasavin

23.06 - 02.07.2011 Contacts MIFF.TV 1 BARRON

Sorigt Vadimir Eremin, Aleksey Dutlanev, Konstantin Vorsityov, Eksterina Tridatova (original stea by Igar General producer loor Uppleikov Producers law Llootskie, Rubes Debutshues, Vacley Zenetalin

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PSYOPS

ЭТА ДЕВОЧКА НЕ БЫЛА УБИТА УКРАИНСКИМИ ВОЕННЫМИ В СЛАВЯНСКЕ

ОНА ПОГИБЛА В КРЫМУ В 2013



РАССКАЖИ МНЕ СВИДОМЫЙ ЗА ЧТО ТВОЯ АРМИЯ УБИЛА ЭТУ ДЕВОЧКУ 19.06.2014 В СЛАВЯНСКЕ?



В этом нет ничего классного, но это единственный способ в

одноклассниках распространить информацию!

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Девочку, погношую из-за обрушения балкона в санатории «Юность», похоронили

05-36,2013 14:34

Сопдон во Львове похорожити 10-летион Долер Содельник, наторая полибла в разультата пареноя базника в датског санатори «Очести». Бе тело приевсти на Крыхая накажуле вечерои, правет «Консонсписан правда»

На покроны приате больше 200 человек родствонник знакован школьники, учетеля и простые паковне Процине составлясь в хране Возполения Полса Пресалтов богодокци, а тогоронени Диану на сельског кладбоца недалоно от Пъезва.

Отчение шель, в которой учетись Довка, прише в вышевника, старцейска снеки сраду же после экоаннов. Все быте с цетанах, в основном с бершие розвит и веники. Доте зесле портрат.



Дляны, а по дороге к катафалку останавливались все нацины и пропускати покрочную продесско. Во время дерезония продания два напочния потеряти сознание. К спастью у крана декурита конрали, и ребят сраку не изкачалия. — подет недание



PSYOSP



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OPSEC





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Presence





Posture





Profile

Before



In Georgia



Ukraine, Crimea



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Deception

THIS IS NOT DONBASS, UKRAINE IT'S BOSNIA he Typera, a Seriour p hole & 2001 Rost Havin #SaveDonbassFromUkraineArmy



Deception

ЭТО НЕ УКРАИНА В 2014

ЭТО ЧЕЧНЯ В 1995



Novorossiya Rises

Death in #Ukraine. pic.twitter.com/FJnVn5MvoO

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"War in Chechnya. Grozny, Chechnya, 1995." by Peter Turnley

EXCELLENCI olutions mapping



Deception

ЭТО НЕ НАЦГВАРДЕЕЦ

ЭТО РЕКВИЗИТ В ФИЛЬМУ "МЫ ИЗ БУДУЩЕГО", СОЗДАТЕЛЬ РЕКВИЗИТА ДЕЛАЕТ ШУТЛИВЫЕ ФОТО С НИМ



solution

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Regimedia





EW - Electronical warfare





Victoria Nuland US State Department



US-Diplomatin Victoria Nuland und US-Botschafter Jeffrey Payette besprechen die weiteren Schritte bei der von den USA gesteuerten Revolution in der Ukraine.

"Die großen Drei"



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




Kumetaitis: Yes, this is the Deputy Director just standing before you and looking in south-east direction.



Physical destruction






Key leader engagement

RUSSIAN TV CLAIMED RIGHT SECTOR PARTY LEADER DMYTRO YAROSH WAS LEADING IN ELECTION POLL RESULTS POROSHENKO WAS LEADING IN REAL POLL RESULTS WITH 55.9%, YAROSH RECEIVED 0.9%





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Key leader engagement



Computer network operations, cyber war



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Civil Military Cooperations







23



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Strategic narratives

- Ukrainians are not an independent nation. They are part of Russian world
- Ukraine is nazi state, populated with banderovtsi. Great War against fashist continues.
- West is divided
- Russian actions are legitimate



Strengths of Russia's information campaign

- **Right timing:** vacuum of power in Kyiv, West reluctant to involve by military means
- **Long-term preparation:** readiness to conduct the new type of warfare (lessons-learned from previous conflicts), policy and legal documents in place
- **Strategic C2:** effective use of power vertical, narrative control in media (incl. falsification), use of strategic communications (incl. military component)
- Use of «Compatriots policy» as a tool of influence: maintenance of common information space
- Knowledge of target audiences: ability to manipulate with the values, needs, historic memory, emotions of the target audience
- **Deception:** massive use of deception to mislead adversary and gain more time (case of MH17)



Weaknesses of Russia's information campaign

- **Disinformation campaigns erode over time –** but they can be rather successful in short term
- Say-do gap and inconsistency in messages : public denial of military intervention despite obvious proof of Western media, no promised Paradise in Crimea, half-empty humanitarian aid convoy; contradicting messages of Kremlin and separatists (*Novorossiya* Youtube channel).
- Inability to control social media: even with increased state attempts to control Internet media, it works well to reveal fake information and provide alternatives. Example of Russian soldiers' posts in social media.
- **Poor assessment of western reactions:** Russian aggression has mobilised and united the Western democracies, NATO, EU, its reputation is damaged, Ukraine likely to become a long-term enemy.



Conclusions

- Communication capabilities as soft power in modern war are playing important role before and during crisis.
- Russian narratives are based on historical memory and they are persistent.
- Crisis in Ukraine is result of Russia's long term strategy
- Compatriots abroad will be used as tool to fulfil fatherland ambitions
- Deception is used by Russia as tactic to distract and delay.
- Disinformation campaigns erode over time. Truth will win.



Questions?

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